The theory of learning in games has sought to understand how and why equilibria emerge in non-cooperative games. Traditionally, social science literature develops descriptive game theoretic models for players, analyzes the limiting behavior, and generalizes the results for larger classes of games. Recently, there has been a significant amount of research seeking to understand these behavioral models not from a descriptive point of view, but rather from a prescriptive point of view [1]- [4] . The goal is to use these behavioral models as a prescriptive control approach in distributed multi-agent systems where the guaranteed limiting behavior would represent a desirable operating condition.
learning guarantees that only the joint action profiles that maximize the potential function are stochastically stable. The enabler for these results is the introduction of noise into the decision making process [7] - [10] . In log-linear learning, this noise permits players to occasionally make mistakes, where mistakes represent the selection of suboptimal actions. The structure of the noise in log-linear learning is such that the probability of selecting a suboptimal action is associated with the magnitude of the payoff difference associated with a best response and the suboptimal action. As the noise vanishes, the probability that a player selects a suboptimal action goes to zero.
The traditional analysis of log-linear learning has centered around explicitly computing the stationary distribution. This analysis relies on a highly structured setting:
(i) Players' utility functions constitute a potential game.
(ii) Players update their strategies one at a time, which we refer to as asynchrony.
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(iii) At any stage, a player can select any action in the action set, which we refer to as completeness. (iv) Each player is endowed with the ability to assess the utility he would have received for any alternative action provided that the actions of all other players remain fixed. Since the appeal of log-linear learning is not solely the explicit form of the stationary distribution, we seek to address to what degree one can relax the structural assumptions while maintaining that only potential function maximizers are stochastically stable. Our motivation for this relaxation is that the structured setting of log-linear learning may inhibit its applicability as a distributed control mechanism in many distributed systems.
I. BACKGROUND
We consider a finite strategic-form game with n-player set I := {1, ..., n} where each player i has a finite action set A i and a utility function
For an action profile a = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n ) ∈ A, let a −i denote the profile of player actions other than player i, i.e., a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ).
With this notation, we will sometimes write a profile a of actions as (a i , a −i ). Similarly, we may write U i (a) as U i (a i , a −i ). Let A −i = j =i A j denote the set of possible collective actions of all players other than player i. We define 1 It is worth noting that the usage of asynchrony in this paper is inconsistent with the standard usage of the term in computer science where the term references each agent's common knowledge of the clock.
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This paper focuses primarily on the class of potential games [11] . In a potential game, the change in a player's utility that results from a unilateral change in strategy equals the change in the global utility. Specifically, there is a function φ : A → R such that for every player i ∈ I, for every a −i ∈ A −i , and for every a i , a i ∈ A i ,
When this condition is satisfied, the game is called an (exact) potential game with the potential function φ. In potential games, any action profile maximizing the potential function is a pure Nash equilibrium, hence every potential game possesses at least one such equilibrium.
II. LOG-LINEAR LEARNING
The following iterative learning algorithm is known as loglinear learning [7] . Let a(t) represent the action profile at time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. At each time t > 0, one player i ∈ I is randomly chosen and allowed to alter his current action. All other players must repeat their current action at the ensuing time step, i.e. a −i (t) = a −i (t−1). At time t, player i selects an action according the the following probabilistic strategy
for any action a i ∈ A i and temperature τ > 0. The temperature τ determines how likely player i is to select a suboptimal action. As τ → ∞, player i will select any action a i ∈ A i with equal probability. As τ → 0, player i will select a best response to the action profile a −i (t − 1), i.e., a i (t) ∈ B i (a −i (t − 1)) with arbitrarily high probability.
In the case of a non-unique best response, player i will select a best response at random (uniformly). Consider any potential game with potential function φ : A → R. In the repeated potential game in which all players adhere to log-linear learning, the stationary distribution of the joint action profiles is µ ∈ ∆(A) where [7] µ(a) = e
One can interpret the stationary distribution µ as follows. For sufficiently large times t > 0, µ(a) equals the probability that a(t) = a. As one decreases the temperature, τ → 0, all the weight of the stationary distribution µ is on the joint actions that maximize the potential function.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTION The main contribution of this paper is demonstrating that the structural assumption of log linear learning, (i)-(iv), can be relaxed while maintaining that only potential function maximizers are in the support of the limiting distribution
This is equivalent to saying that only potential function maximizers are stochastically stable. We introduce slight variants of log-linear learning to include both synchronous updates and incomplete action sets. In both settings, we prove that only potential function maximizers are stochastically stable. Furthermore, we introduce a payoff-based version of log-linear learning, in which players are only aware of the utility they received and the action that they played. Note that log-linear learning in its original form is not a payoff-based learning algorithm. In the payoff-based loglinear learning, we also prove that only potential maximizers are stochastically stable. This result follows a string of research analyzing payoff-based dynamics, also referred to as completely uncoupled dynamics, in games, e.g., [12] , [13] . In general, the existing literature focuses on convergence to Nash equilibrium or -Nash equilibrium in different classes of games using only payoff-based information. In contrast to these results, our proposed algorithm provides convergence to the best Nash equilibrium, i.e., the potential function maximizer, using only payoff-based information. The key enabler for these results is to change the focus of the analysis away from deriving the explicit form of the stationary distribution of the learning process towards characterizing the stochastically stable states. The resulting analysis uses the theory of resistance trees for regular perturbed Markov decision processes [8] .
